ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS INTERNATIONAL LAW

By: Sarkisyan (Gracheva) A.M.

The article reveals the implications of defining and measuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Particular attention is paid to developing recommendations for improving the efficiency of enforcing sanctions.

Keywords: economic sanctions, enforcement, efficiency of sanctions, countermeasures

Photo by Kampus Production: https://www.pexels.com/photo/men-working-at-the-office-8353790/

Economic sanctions are a widely known non-military mechanism for regulation and coercion in international disputes. However, the institution of economic sanctions has several significant theoretical and procedural issues. The Charter of the United Nations (UN) establishes the necessity for coercion in international law. The UN Security Council enforces such coercion to eliminate any threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression and develops recommendations or decisions on measures to be taken in each specific situation—whether involving armed forces or not—to maintain or restore international peace and security. Among the measures not involving armed forces is the "complete or partial interruption of economic relations," which implies the application of economic sanctions.

This institution has significant flaws, casting doubt on the effectiveness of sanctions. The UN Secretary-General's 2000 report on the work of the Organization notes, "sanctions do not always yield the same results in terms of inducing compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, and in recent years their effectiveness has increasingly been questioned." The ineffectiveness of economic sanctions is associated with many problems arising during their application. The most pressing issue is the lack of strategic focus and the ability to predict end results. The outcomes of sanctions are often unpredictable, particularly due to the absence of clear indicators and ineffective forecasting. Consequently, the civilian population of the sanctioned country suffers "collateral damage" and material harm. The significance of this issue is reflected in the UN Millennium Declaration.

The UN Millennium Declaration pays attention to peace, security, and disarmament issues and highlights the need to minimize the adverse effects of UN economic sanctions on innocent population groups, monitor sanction regimes continuously, and mitigate unintended adverse effects of sanctions on third parties[1].

Humanitarian consequences, economic damage, and other factors are often incorrectly predicted, leading to severe outcomes. For instance, countermeasures and sanctions may succeed in destabilizing the Syrian regime, but a shift to another dictatorial government could inflict unforeseen political and economic harm on Syria's population and other countries. The effectiveness of each sanction regime depends solely on achieving its objectives, necessitating a study of how these objectives are determined. The UN Charter's general goal for economic sanctions is to eliminate threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression and enforce specific UN Security Council resolutions. However, the theory of success is complicated by various factors and changing circumstances during the sanctions process.

Achieving set goals implies that each instance or period of the sanctions process will have its own defined success. Beyond temporal factors, the paradox of the success or effectiveness of economic sanctions lies in determining reasonable damage relative to the goal, which is not always possible. It is evident that the most successful operations are those with minimal costs. In his works that illustrate the importance of defining success with consideration of consequences, David Baldwin provides exceptional examples: "The operation was successful, but the patient died; it's like amputating a leg to remove a wart from a toe; winning a nuclear war at the cost of global collapse; and imposing economic sanctions to subdue a state at the expense of bankrupting the sanctioning member states.[2]"

The understanding of the objectives of economic sanctions is quite diverse. For example, the UN Security Council may impose economic or even military sanctions in response to disapproval of certain behaviors. Sanctions against South Africa are an example of sanctions imposed due to "moral disapproval" of policies, in this case, racial segregation known as apartheid. It should also be noted that during the negotiation stages of these sanctions against South Africa and the National Party, consequences such as a threat to the peace of the entire population were not considered[3]. According to Hedley Bull, a Professor of International Relations at Oxford, "Sanctions are often applied without any clear idea of the outcomes of their imposition; frequently, when one country imposes a trade embargo or other forms of economic sanctions on another, it is not as an alternative to war, or because there are economical means to resolve disputes peacefully, but because there is a perceived need to take action to coerce the state and bring it to its knees[4]".

Despite some scholars' attempts to measure the impact of sanctions and countermeasures, significant uncertainty remains in developing a system to gauge the success of sanction regimes. Gary Hufbauer, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a sanctions specialist, divides success into two parts: 1) the target country's compliance with required political actions and 2) the consequences of the imposed economic sanctions. His analysis includes the impact on all parties involved in the sanctions regime, including the target state, the Security Council, and member states. Hufbauer's distinction in success also applies to countermeasures. While UN countermeasures and sanctions differ, the interest in success and objective achievement is similar.

Hufbauer analyzed 204 instances of economic sanctions and countermeasures from 1914 to 1990, taking into account the stated objectives of the sanctions as declared by the imposing entities, and then assessing the fact of achieving these goals. His research on economic sanctions since World War II confirmed that only one in three sanction regimes managed to alter the target country's behavior to some extent. The study also found that U.S. countermeasures were effective in one out of five cases from 1975 to 1980, a success rate that dropped by twenty-four percent since 1973. Among UN sanctions, Hufbauer identified that sanctions were fully successful in achieving their intended goal with minimal damage only in three instances: "The three successful sanction regimes are the League of Nations against Yugoslavia, the League of Nations against Greece, and the United States against Egypt. In the first case, Yugoslavia withdrew its troops from Albania to avoid sanctions. In the second, Greece complied with the League of Nations' recommendations to withdraw troops from Bulgaria and compensate for damages. In the third case, Egypt ceased funding Congolese rebels, stopped anti-American attacks in the Egyptian press, and withdrew support from Arab states in operations on the Jordanian front" [5].

A clear example of unsuccessful sanctions can be seen in U.S.-Libyan relations. In 1969, Libyan military officers overthrew the king, and the leader of the insurgents, Muammar Gaddafi, took control of the state. In an attempt to brutally suppress a rebellion against his dictatorship in 2011, Muammar Gaddafi was killed during a civil war. Under the auspices of a UN Security Council resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France began military actions against the Libyan government to protect civilians, becoming involved in the Libyan civil war of 2011. Immediately after the Libyan leader was killed, the country plunged into chaos and disaster. Various regions were controlled by different factions, and two different parliaments were established in Libya. The terrorist organization ISIS took over the Libyan city of Sirte. President Obama had previously expressed regret about the consequences of intervention in Libya. In a March interview with The Atlantic, he mentioned that the operation went as he had hoped, but Libya is now in total disarray.

In the interview, he also criticized the decisions of the British and French governments, noting that after the military operations concluded, British Prime Minister David Cameron did not show interest in the political situation in Libya[6]. U.S. President Barack Obama stated that the most serious mistake of his presidency was the lack of preparation for the aftermath of the overthrow of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi[7]. In light of this, there remains an unresolved issue of how to define objectives to minimize such consequences correctly. Capitulation can also result from military actions initiated due to UN sanctions or countermeasures. Therefore, sanctions can be seen as a precursor to war. British legal scholars note a close connection between sanctions and armed conflicts. Experts in sanction disputes have argued that if member states are not prepared for possible military consequences, then sanctions should not be applied at all.

As Lord Baldwin, quoting E.H. Carr, stated, "one of the many conclusions I have reached is that there is no such thing as a sanction that will work and not lead to war. [8] " Following the implementation of "non-military" sanctions, armed conflicts began in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia, and Serbia. In Afghanistan, the main sanctions (resolutions 1988 and 1989) were imposed due to acts of terrorism, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban regime in 1998. These sanctions initially affected the entire population and, after disasters resulting from the U.S. invasion in 2001, were adjusted and reduced concerning specific individuals. Thus, the change in the sanction regimes resulted from military aggression. Moreover, military action was also taken in Somalia in 1992. The US-led "Operation Restore Hope" was conducted in 1992-1993 and continued with the battle in Mogadishu. Military actions continue to this day, but in August 2014, the Somali government launched Operation "Indian Ocean." On September 1st, American forces fired a missile that killed the leader of al-Shabab, Godane, which was, in turn, perceived as a successful operation.

Professor Peter Wallensteen, a leading scholar in international relations, discussed the definition of success, writing that "defining success is undoubtedly important and can be part of a broader discussion. In military strategy, two outcomes often matter: victory or defeat. Thus, the success or failure of sanctions is also clear: either the sanctioning body achieves a change in the behavior of the offending country (success) or not (failure)." David Baldwin echoes this view, suggesting that effectiveness itself can be divided into three categories:

1. The subject of sanctions, referring to the range of issues concerning sanctions;

2. The impact of sanctions, determining how they affect the behavior of the offending country; and

3. The sphere of activity measured quantitatively refers to the number of people, countries, and international organizations involved. These three categories are closely linked to measuring the effectiveness of sanctions. While Baldwin excludes side effects, current research confirms their significance and that they are a key factor in determining the success and effectiveness of economic sanctions.

In response to the recognized deficiencies in sanction regimes, the five permanent members of the Security Council published a summary on the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The document states that "subsequent collective actions in the Security Council regarding any future sanction regime should aim to identify unintended negative side effects on the most vulnerable populations" and that "the structure and implementation of future sanction regimes may vary based on the resource base of the target country." The Council noted that "assessments of objectively short-term and long-term humanitarian consequences within the overall economic sanctions regime" and "proper attention to the humanitarian situation"[9] are among the most important factors in developing a sanctions regime.

From the above, it's clear that the institution of economic sanctions requires a regulated phase of forecasting and analyzing potential economic and humanitarian damage well before sanctions are imposed. This should include foundational sections on economic and political efficacy, timelines of the sanction regime and planned actions during the regime, consideration of unforeseen circumstances and all possible consequences quantitatively, and developing a compensation plan for damage caused to third parties.

Reference Bibliography List

1. "Charter of the United Nations" Art. 39, Ch. VII (Adopted in San Francisco on June 26, 1945)

2. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." A/59/565, December 2, 2004. Part 2. "Collective Security and the Challenge of Prevention." Chapter VIII. "The Role of Sanctions." Para. 178. URL: http://www.un.org/russian/secureworld.html.

3. United Nations Millennium Declaration, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000, URL: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/summitdecl.shtml

4. Sami Moubayed. Syria and the USA: Washington's Relations With Damascus From Wilson to Eisenhower (I.B. Tauris, distributed by Palgrave Macmillan; 2012) pg. 207

5. Resolution 418 (1977) of November 4, 1977: Question of South Africa URL: https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/460382.81172514.html

6. Robert J. O'Neill & David N. Schwartz (eds), Hedley Bull on Arms Control, Macmillan, 1987, pg.113

7. Sanctions by Kimberly Ann Elliott, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg, Liberty Fund, 2008, pg. 66

8. Neiman A.M. E.H. Carr: from "political realism" to "new society" // History and Historians: Historiographical Yearbook, 1978. — Moscow, 1981. — P. 96—112.

9. Letter dated 13 April 1995 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1995/ 300 (1995) ('Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions').

Саркисян (Грачева) Анна Михайловна – Стажер сектора международно-правовых исследований (специальность 12.00.10), ФГБУН Институт государства и права Российской академии наук

Соискатель степени кандидата юридических наук (специальность 12.00.10), ГБУН Институт государства и права Российской академии наук

amgracheva@gmail.com

Sarkisyan (Gracheva) Anna Mikhailovna A.N. – Intern of the International Legal Studies Sector (Major 12.00.10) FBIS Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences,

Сandidate for a PhD Degree in Legal Sciences Majoring in «International Law; European Law» (major 12.00.10), FBIS Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences

[1] United Nations Millennium Declaration, Adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000, URL: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/declarations/summitdecl.shtml [2] URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20(1999-2000)%20The%20Sanctions%20Debate%20and%20the%20Logic%20of%20Choice.pdf [3] Resolution 418 (1977) of November 4, 1977: Question of South Africa URL: https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/460382.81172514.html [4] Robert J. O'Neill & David N. Schwartz (eds), Hedley Bull on Arms Control, Macmillan, 1987, pg.113 [5] Sanctions by Kimberly Ann Elliott, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Barbara Oegg, Liberty Fund, 2008, pg. 66 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sanctions.html [6] URL: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm [7] URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/ [8] . Neiman A.M. E.H. Carr: From "Political Realism" to a "New Society" // History and Historians: Historiographical Yearbook, 1978. — Moscow, 1981. — P. 96—112. [9] Letter dated 13 April 1995 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1995/ 300 (1995) ('Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions').Sarkisyan (Gracheva) A.M.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW